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Articles & Other Documents:

[U.S. And Russia Will Police Nuclear Terrorists](#)

[Announcing the Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism](#)

[U.S.-Russia Joint Fact Sheet on the Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism](#)

[Kim Jong Il And His Generals](#)

[Security Council Rebukes N. Korea](#)

[North Korea Is Defiant Over U.N. Council Nuclear Resolution](#)

[Western Incentives Package Is Basis For Negotiations, Iran Says](#)

[A Pledge To Track Uranium Fades](#)

[Nuclear Know-How Trail](#)

[Pyongyang Visit Tied To Nuclear Reactor](#)

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New York Times
July 15, 2006

U.S. And Russia Will Police Nuclear Terrorists

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, July 14 — President Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on Saturday will announce a new global program to track potential nuclear terrorists, detect and lock up bomb-making materials and coordinate their responses if terrorists obtain a weapon, according to administration officials who have negotiated the deal.

Within months, the officials said, they expect China, Japan, the major European powers, Kazakhstan and Australia to form the initial group of nations under what the two leaders are calling "The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism." The informal organization of countries is based on the American-led "Proliferation Security Initiative," a group of more than 70 countries that have pledged to help seize illicit weapons as they move across oceans or are transported by air. Some countries in that group now hold regular drills to share intelligence and practice seizures. But the nuclear terrorism initiative, the final details of which were worked out in a meeting between American and Russian officials in Vienna last weekend, goes beyond interdiction. It would operate inside the borders of countries with nuclear weapons and materials, setting standards for protection and detection, and develop common strategies aimed at terror groups.

A statement that the two leaders are expected to release Saturday morning underscores that the countries have come to regard terrorists, rather than each other, as the largest nuclear threat. The statement will describe how they plan to coordinate their nuclear response teams to "mitigate the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism" and to "ensure cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism."

Robert Joseph, the under secretary of state for arms control and international security, and the architect of the new initiative, said in an interview that the threat was considered so urgent that both nations set aside their differences on issues from energy to Mr. Putin's move toward authoritarianism to establish the new program.

"We have differences with Russia as well as common interests," Mr. Joseph said. "One obvious common interest is combating nuclear terrorism, which is a threat to both of our countries."

He said he expected that an organizational meeting of the new group in the fall would involve about 11 countries, adding that other nations "will be free to join if they share our concerns."

Even some critics of Mr. Bush's nuclear policies and the pace at which Russia has moved to secure its own nuclear facilities said they welcomed the new plan.

"This has been much needed for years," said Matthew Bunn, a Harvard nuclear expert who is one of the authors of an annual survey of potential nuclear perils called "Securing the Bomb." "It's very impressive, especially if the administration is successful at expanding it."

The latest edition of the Harvard survey, published Friday, includes reports of the arrest in April of several people who obtained 22 kilograms (48.5 pounds) of low-enriched uranium stolen from Elektrostal, a Russian fuel plant.

While the low-enriched uranium was not weapons-grade, the same plant processes uranium that could fuel a weapon.

Like the Proliferation Security Initiative, which started with a small core of countries and has now expanded around the world, the new group is not based on a treaty and has no central bureaucracy or headquarters. Instead, it is the kind of loose-knit international organization that Mr. Bush favors, a coalition built for a specific purpose, made up of countries that volunteer.

"If there is one conclusion this president has come to, it's that treaties take too long to write, and they are too hard to change," one senior White House official said recently.

The official, who was not authorized to speak publicly about internal administration policy, described Mr. Bush's frustrations at the difficulties in tightening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty so that countries like Iran could not exploit loopholes that allow nations to build a nuclear weapons capacity while declaring its program is for peaceful civilian purposes. The president, the official said, "wants speed and flexibility."

The new agreement is to be announced at the same time that both countries declare the opening of negotiations on a long-discussed pact on civilian nuclear uses that could pave the way for Russia to become one of the world's largest repositories of spent nuclear fuel.

Russia's enthusiasm for the new arrangement on nuclear terrorism is notable because it was not an original member of the Proliferation Security Initiative. It has since joined. The initiative's best-known success was the interception four years ago of the *BBC China*, a German ship bound for Libya that was halted, brought to port and emptied of centrifuge parts for Libya's nuclear weapons program. Administration officials argue that interception convinced Libya to give up the program and to turn over all of its parts, most of which it had obtained from the nuclear network built by the former head of Pakistan's nuclear laboratory, Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Pakistan and India are not on the list of nations expected to be early members of the program, and they are not members of the Proliferation Security Initiative. Both are enormously sensitive about allowing any outside supervision or influence on their nuclear weapons programs. Both countries, along with Israel, have refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

While experts argue about how successful the Proliferation Security Initiative has been, far more countries have joined than many experts expected several years ago. Mr. Joseph said that more than 30 illicit transfers had been halted, in some stage or another, by member countries. But the administration will not describe most of those cases, saying the countries often do not want to be identified.

One of the more notable successes came last year, when China, under pressure, denied Iran the right to fly over its territory with a military aircraft that had apparently flown to North Korea to pick up missile parts. The Chinese have never confirmed the incident.

But if the proliferation initiative covers borders, oceans and airspace, the nuclear terrorism program is intended to operate within countries. "It's a very different objective," Mr. Bunn said. "The proliferation program doesn't deal with securing stockpiles or detection, or hunting down the materials or the terrorists if something goes wrong."

For more than a decade, the United States has financed a program to secure or remove nuclear material in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. The history of that program has been bumpy, though experts said that an agreement reached between Washington and Moscow several months ago helped to speed the program.

The new initiative is a next step and, if successful, would set standards for securing such material around the world. It would also develop new technology to secure nuclear material and detect it inside cities and at crucial crossing points. Already the United States is putting detection equipment at some ports overseas, but Mr. Joseph said that this effort "would be much broader."

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/15/world/europe/15nuke.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Announcing the Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism

The White House

Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Russian Federation President V.V. Putin

St. Petersburg, Russia

July 15, 2006

The United States of America and Russia are committed to combating the threat of nuclear terrorism, which is one of the most dangerous international security challenges we face.

Today we announce our decision to launch the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Building on our earlier work, the Global Initiative reflects our intention to pursue the necessary steps with all those who share our views to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities. These objectives are reflected in the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities as amended in 2005, the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and other international legal frameworks relevant to combating nuclear terrorism.

The United States and Russia call upon like-minded nations to expand and accelerate efforts that develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis. Together with other participating countries and interacting closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we will take steps to improve participants' capabilities to: ensure accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive substances, as well as security of nuclear facilities; detect and suppress illicit trafficking or other illicit activities involving such materials, especially measures to prevent their acquisition and use by terrorists; respond to and mitigate the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism; ensure cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism; ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials; and strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who facilitate such acts.

We stress that consolidated efforts and cooperation to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism will be carried out in accordance with international law and national legislation. This Global Initiative builds on the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which Russia and the United States were the first to sign on September 14, 2005. This unique international treaty provides for broad areas of cooperation between states for the purpose of detecting, preventing, suppressing, and investigating acts of nuclear terrorism.

One of our priority objectives remains full implementation by all countries of the provisions of UNSCR 1540, which was adopted in 2004 as a result of joint efforts by the United States and Russia. This resolution is an important non-proliferation instrument aimed at preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from entering "black market" networks and, above all, keeping WMD and related material from falling into the hands of terrorists. The full implementation by all countries of UNSCR 1373, including the sharing of information pertaining to the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation, also remains a priority.

We note the importance of IAEA activities in implementing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities, as amended and its Plan entitled "Physical Nuclear Security - Measures to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism," and we reaffirm our willingness to continue supporting and working with the IAEA in this area to enhance the effectiveness of national systems for accounting, control, physical protection of nuclear materials and radioactive substances, and the security of civilian nuclear facilities, and, where necessary, to establish such systems.

We trust that, through their participation in this new Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, all countries that share our common goals of suppressing and mitigating the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism will - on a voluntary basis and on the basis of independent responsibility of each country for the steps taken within its jurisdiction - reinforce the joint efforts to increase international cooperation in combating this threat.

The United States and the Russian Federation reaffirm that issues related to safeguarding nuclear weapons and other nuclear facilities, installations and materials used for military purposes remain strictly the national prerogative of the

nuclear weapons state parties to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), for which they bear special responsibility. The Joint Statement on Nuclear Security, which we adopted in Bratislava, noted that while the security of nuclear facilities in the United States and Russian Federation meets current requirements, these requirements must be constantly enhanced to counter evolving terrorist threats. We trust that the other nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT will also ensure a proper level of protection for their nuclear facilities, while taking into account the constantly changing nature of the terrorist threat.

As part of this initiative, we intend to work with countries possessing sensitive nuclear technologies to reaffirm their commitment to take all necessary measures to ensure proper protection and safeguarding of nuclear facilities and relevant materials in their territory.

We will be prepared to work with all those who share our views to strengthen mechanisms for multilateral and bilateral cooperation to suppress acts of nuclear terrorism, with a view to practical implementation of the measures provided for in the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as well as in other relevant international legal frameworks.

Released on July 15, 2006

<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/69021.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Media Note

Office of the Spokesman

Washington, DC

July 15, 2006

U.S.-Russia Joint Fact Sheet on the Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Under Secretary Joseph will be available to answer questions about nuclear terrorism online. [View Transcript](#)

Below is the text of a joint United States and Russia Fact Sheet on the [Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism](#).

- The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism will enhance cooperation between and build the capacity of all willing partner nations to combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism. This cooperation will include determined and systematic efforts to:
 - improve accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive substances, as well as security of nuclear facilities;
 - detect and suppress illicit trafficking or other illicit activities involving such materials, especially measures to prevent their acquisition and use by terrorists;
 - respond to and mitigate the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism;
 - ensure cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism;
 - ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials;
 - to strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who facilitate such acts.
- Presidents Bush and Putin have committed to combating the threat of nuclear terrorism and pursuing the necessary steps with other willing partner nations to combat nuclear terrorism.

"Over the last two years, a great coalition has come together to defeat terrorism and to oppose the spread of weapons of mass destruction -- the inseparable commitments of the war on terror...Terrorists and terror states are in a race for weapons of mass murder, a race they must lose. Terrorists are resourceful; we're more resourceful. They're determined; we must be more determined. We will never lose focus or resolve. We'll be unrelenting in the defense of free nations, and rise to the hard demands of dangerous times.

"The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons...What has changed in the 21st century is that, in the hands of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction would be a first resort -- the preferred means to further their ideology of suicide and random murder. These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide, and transport. Armed with a single vial of a biological agent or a single nuclear weapon, small groups of fanatics, or failing states, could gain the power to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace...America, and the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes, and unbending purpose. I have made clear to all the policy of this nation: America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most deadly weapons." -- President George W. Bush, February 11, 2004

“Our shared task is to create a united front in the struggle against this evil. Any attempts to instigate terrorism, accommodate terrorists, or use terrorists for political means or goals must meet general condemnation... On behalf of our countries, we have just signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. As you know, Russia was the initiator of this document and we thank our partners for their support. The result of this teamwork is an effective legal tool to prevent real threats, such as terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.” -- President Vladimir Putin, September 15, 2005

- The U.S. and Russia have invited initial partner nations to attend an initial meeting to elaborate and endorse a Statement of Principles for this Initiative. The U.S. and Russia have also invited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to serve as an observer.
- The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism is an important, although not the exclusive, legal basis for the work of the Initiative. Other important legal bases include the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, and UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540, as well as national legal authorities.
- The activities of the Initiative should include national efforts and could include inter alia multinational exercises, expert-level meetings to share best practices, and the provision of assistance from those nations in a position to offer such assistance to those nations requiring it.
- Taking into account the global character of the Initiative, the participants will seek to mobilize the largest possible number of nations to improve national capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism. To this end, both agree that outreach to related industries and the public is necessary to effect the full implementation of the Initiative.
- In launching this Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, both the U.S. and Russia reaffirm their commitment to non-proliferation while promoting legitimate cooperation in peaceful nuclear activities for the prosperity of all nations.
- The Initiative will not address issues related to safeguarding nuclear weapons and other nuclear facilities, installations, and materials used for military purposes remain strictly the national prerogative of the nuclear weapons state parties to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), for which they bear special responsibility.

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/69016.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

San Diego Union-Tribune
July 14, 2006

Kim Jong Il And His Generals

By Tai Ming Cheung

The July 4 missile firings by North Korea underline an important and potentially ominous development in North Korean politics: the increasing importance of the military in the country's national decision-making.

The six-party talks aimed at resolving the current nuclear stalemate have been stalled since last September. At that time, the parties reached an important agreement that would, in principle, resolve the crisis. In return for abandoning its nuclear program, North Korea would gain a security guarantee, diplomatic recognition and access to the international financial institutions. North Korea has refused to return to the talks since financial sanctions were imposed by the United States last November on its counterfeiting activities.

Most analyses of the launches see them as a bid to regain the attention of the United States, which has been distracted by Iraq and the ongoing conflict over the Iranian nuclear program. By showing its military capabilities, Pyongyang is making a bid for more concessions in the six-party talks.

But the tests could also mark the ascent of a harder line within North Korea that seeks to hold on to the nuclear gains it has made during the Bush administration.

Since he assumed the leadership of the country following the death of his father in 1994, Kim Jong Il has assiduously courted the military, which has eclipsed the Communist Party – formally the Korean Workers Party – in political significance. Despite ongoing economic hardships, the country fields a standing army of 1.2 million troops out of a population of 22 million, with another 6 million reservists.

Kim's formal position as the country's paramount leader is derived not from the presidency or head of the party, but through his chairmanship of the National Defense Commission. Moreover, Kim has articulated a new ideology – “military first politics” – which elevates the military over other sectors of society.

The missile program, showcased by the recent launches, translates into economic benefits for the army and the state. The ballistic missiles that were tested are – along with the fledgling nuclear weapons program – the technological

crown jewels of an otherwise impoverished country and one of its very few export items. Despite a devastating famine in the mid-1990s and ongoing food shortages to this day, the military establishment consumes between 25 percent and 50 percent of gross national product annually.

The North Korean missile industry is capable of producing an extensive range of short-and medium-range ballistic missiles. The Pentagon estimates that the North Korean military has an arsenal of more than 800 home-made ballistic missiles, mostly shorter-range Scuds that are copies of earlier generation Soviet missiles. Pyongyang has sold a sizable number of these missiles and the know-how to develop them to countries such as Iran, Pakistan and Yemen, earning the country hundreds of millions of dollars in badly needed foreign exchange.

The development of the Taepodong-2 missile represents a generational advance in technology and capabilities for the North Korean missile industry. As a commentary by the official North Korean Central News Agency pointed out, "In a powerful state, the defense industry takes a leading and key position in the economy. As long as the imperialists continue to exist, the defense industry is a lifeline for the country and the nation."

The failure of the missile during the latest test represents a temporary setback for the program. But the failure will also spur the North Koreans to intensify their efforts to rectify the technical deficiencies and eventually conduct a successful test. High rates of failure are common even in successful missile development programs in other countries.

North Korea has made some limited efforts in the past few years to energize the economy by limited market reforms. The occasional visits of Kim Jong Il to China – most recently in January – have led to guarded optimism that he might be persuaded to follow the "open door" development path that has transformed the Chinese economy into a global powerhouse. But a key factor behind China's economic success was a far-reaching demilitarization of its economy and an opening up to the outside world. North Korea has moved in the opposite direction.

The influential role that the military plays in Pyongyang's decision-making casts a major shadow over the six-party talks process. The generals do not directly participate in the negotiations but are instead represented by civilian diplomats who lack the authority to make important decisions.

With the missile launches sparking widespread military tensions, it would be especially helpful if a new dialogue mechanism were to be established in which U.S. military commanders can engage directly with their North Korean counterparts, either within a bilateral or multilateral context, to build confidence. This could be similar, for instance, to military-to-military interactions that the United States holds regularly with China. With around 30,000 U.S. military personnel currently stationed on the Korean Peninsula, the complete absence of direct U.S.-North Korean military contacts can only serve to deepen the mistrust and misunderstanding that could inadvertently trigger conflict.

Cheung, senior research fellow at UCSD-based Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, is a specialist in Asian security studies.

http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060714/news_lz1e14cheung.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

July 16, 2006

Pg. 13

Security Council Rebukes N. Korea

Nations Agree To Demand End Of Missile Program

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS, July 15 -- The U.N. Security Council voted unanimously Saturday to approve a resolution demanding that North Korea cease its ballistic missile program and requiring states to help prevent Pyongyang's import or export of ballistic missiles. The 15 to 0 vote ended an 11-day diplomatic deadlock that pitted the United States, Japan and Europe against Russia and China.

The vote represented the strongest international rebuke of North Korea since 1993, when the council adopted a resolution urging North Korea to reverse a decision to withdraw from the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The accord, Resolution 1695, came after President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who are attending the Group of Eight summit in St. Petersburg, yielded to Chinese and Russian pressure to drop an explicit reference to a provision in the Charter of the United Nations that has traditionally been cited to impose sanctions and authorize military force. The accord also followed a failed Chinese diplomatic initiative to persuade Pyongyang to halt its program.

The Bush administration hailed the council's decision to condemn Pyongyang's July 4 launch of seven missiles, including the unsuccessful launch of the long-range Taepodong-2 missile.

U.S., Japanese and European officials asserted that the unanimous vote sends an unambiguous message to North Korea that it must stop developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, or face more isolation and punishment. Council diplomats said it would also strengthen the United States and its allies in interdicting missile shipments in international waters. In 2002, the White House was compelled to order the release of a seized vessel in the Arabian Sea that was transporting 15 Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen, because there was no provision under international law prohibiting it.

John R. Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, warned after the vote that the United States will press for stronger Security Council action if Pyongyang fails to abide by the council's demands.

"We look forward to North Korea's full, unconditional and immediate compliance with this Security Council resolution," he said. "We hope that North Korea makes the strategic decision that the pursuit of WMD programs and threatening acts like these missile launches make it less, not more, secure. We need to be prepared, though, that North Korea might choose a different path."

It remained unclear whether Saturday's vote would bring an end to missile tests by North Korea, which has previously ignored Security Council demands to stop its nuclear weapons program and submit to U.N. inspections. North Korea's ambassador, Pak Gil Yon, rejected the council's decision as an "unjustifiable and gangsterlike" abuse of power. He denied that Pyongyang had violated any international laws or agreements by launching missiles. North Korea "resolutely condemns the attempt of some countries to misuse the Security Council for the despicable political aim to isolate and put pressure on the DPRK, and totally rejects the resolution," he said using the abbreviation for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"The latest successful missile launches were part of the routine military exercises staged by the Korean people's army to increase their military capacity for self-defense," he added.

The resolution demanded that North Korea suspend ballistic missile activities and abide by a 1999 moratorium on missile tests. It urged the government to return to six-nation talks aimed at eliminating Pyongyang's nuclear weapons. And it expressed "grave concern" at the launches, given that they "could be used as a means to deliver nuclear, chemical or biological payloads."

The resolution negotiations nearly collapsed this week after China threatened to veto any resolution invoking Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, a mandatory provision that has been enforced through economic sanctions or military force.

The United States and Japan overcame Chinese opposition by agreeing to include language offered by France and Britain that only implicitly referred to Chapter 7.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/15/AR2006071500565.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

July 17, 2006

North Korea Is Defiant Over U.N. Council Nuclear Resolution

SEOUL, South Korea, July 16 (Reuters) — North Korea said Sunday that it was not bound by a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing weapons-related sanctions on it, and insisted it would "bolster its war deterrent" in every way.

The Security Council acted with "irresponsibility" by voting unanimously on Saturday for a resolution requiring nations to prevent North Korea from acquiring missile-related items, an unidentified North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman was reported to have said.

"Our republic will bolster its war deterrent for self-defense in every way, by all means and methods, now that the situation has reached the worst phase due to the extremely hostile act of the U.S.," the spokesman was quoted as saying by the official Korean Central News Agency.

North Korea refers to its military buildup and its unconventional weapons programs as its war deterrent, contending that the United States military presence and drills on the Korean peninsula are a prelude to war against it.

The United States says its 30,000 troops are deployed under an alliance with South Korea to deter a military threat from North Korea.

On Sunday, President Hu Jintao of China called for a resumption of six-nation talks aimed at persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program.

"Both sides expressed their commitment to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula," he said after a meeting with President Bush on the sidelines of the Group of 8 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia.

"Both sides agreed to continue their efforts to move forward with the six-party talks so that at the end of the day the entire Korean peninsula can be denuclearized in a peaceful way through dialogue and negotiation," Mr. Hu said.

The Security Council resolution condemns the missile launchings by North Korea on July 5, and demands that it suspend all missile activities and return to the stalled talks.

The resolution requires United Nations members to prevent imports and exports of any material or money relating to North Korea's missile programs or unconventional arms. It demands that North Korea "suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program," and resume a freeze on launching missiles.

The 15-member Security Council wrangled for 10 days over a response to the test firings by North Korea of seven missiles, including a long-range Taepodong 2, which may be able to reach the continental United States but fell into the Sea of Japan.

The Security Council was divided until hours before the vote over whether to cite Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which allows for military force if another specific resolution is adopted.

China had threatened to veto the measure if Chapter VII were mentioned, noting that the American-led invasion of Iraq had occurred without specific Security Council authorization. So Japan, the United States, Britain and France, which had supported including that phrase, had no choice but to drop it. But they said they still considered the language of the resolution tough and binding.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice praised China for supporting the resolution. She said it helped underscore the commitment to the six-nation framework of talks, which have included the United States, North and South Korea, Russia, Japan and China.

China, North Korea's closest ally, sent a mission there but failed to persuade it to return to talks. North Korea has insisted that the United States first lift financial sanctions.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/17/world/asia/17korea.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

USA Today

July 17, 2006

Pg. 6

Western Incentives Package Is Basis For Negotiations, Iran Says

By Associated Press

TEHRAN, Iran — An Iranian spokesman said Sunday that Western incentives to halt Iran's nuclear program were an "acceptable basis" for talks and the country is ready for detailed negotiations.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded that Iran should talk directly to negotiators if it wants to discuss the six-nation proposal.

The package includes economic incentives and a provision for the United States to offer Iran some nuclear technology, lift some sanctions and join direct negotiations. It calls for a long-term moratorium on Iran enriching uranium, which can produce civilian reactor fuel or fissile bomb material.

Frustrated world powers agreed Wednesday to send Iran's case to the United Nations Security Council for possible punishment, saying Tehran had given no sign it would bargain in earnest over its nuclear program.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told reporters in Tehran, "We consider this package an appropriate basis, an acceptable basis" for talks.

"Now is an appropriate opportunity for Iran and Europe to enter detailed negotiations," he said. "Sending the dossier to the U.N. Security Council means blocking and rejecting talks."

Rice said at a meeting of the Group of Eight world powers in St. Petersburg, Russia, that Iran should contact European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana, the envoy who delivered the proposal last month and has been meeting with Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani.

"There is indeed a very good proposal on the table that could be a basis for negotiations," Rice said. "There is also a path ahead to the Security Council on which we are now launched."

Iran plans to respond formally to the offer from the United States, Britain, China, France, Russia and Germany in late August.

The key demand of the permanent Security Council members plus Germany is that Iran stop enriching uranium during talks.

The United States and some of its allies accuse Iran of seeking nuclear weapons. Tehran denies the charge and says its program is aimed at making electricity, not bombs.

Iran has said it will never give up its right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium and produce nuclear fuel, but it has indicated it may temporarily suspend large-scale activities to ease tensions.

Russian lawmaker Konstantin Kosachev, the chairman of the international affairs committee of the lower house of parliament, greeted Tehran's announcement with guarded optimism.

"On the one hand, we must hail any readiness by Tehran at least to discuss the proposals of the six nations," he said. "Unfortunately, we have already witnessed such signals in the past, which then were not followed up." He suspected Iran of "dragging its feet" to avoid concessions. "Iran is playing with fire," he warned. "The international community may one day run out of patience, and unfortunately, the point of view of those who call for maybe a tougher stance on Iran may prevail. Iran must clearly understand that."

http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20060717/a_iran17.art.htm

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Boston Globe
July 17, 2006

A Pledge To Track Uranium Fades

Global fund falls billions of dollars shy of objective

By Bryan Bender, Globe Staff

WASHINGTON -- Four years after the leaders of the world's eight largest economies vowed to raise \$20 billion over 10 years to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials, only \$3.5 billion has been donated -- and far less has been used to secure enriched uranium, the key ingredient of a nuclear weapon.

Hundreds of tons of uranium remain at loosely guarded facilities across Russia and the former Soviet Union, and in nearly 40 other countries, according to specialists. And the need to secure the material has grown: In April, Russian police arrested a foreman in a nuclear plant for attempting to sell 22 kilograms of uranium.

At the annual meeting of Group of Eight leaders in Russia last week, President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin -- calling nuclear terrorism the "greatest threat we face today" -- announced a new effort to train other countries to track, secure, and intercept nuclear materials that may be sought by terrorist groups.

In a joint statement on Saturday, both leaders vowed "to expand and accelerate efforts that develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis."

But the communiqué made no mention of the 2002 initiative, while the issue of securing nuclear materials was near the bottom of the agenda at this year's summit, below energy cooperation and a slew of foreign-policy crises. The low priority demonstrates that the international effort to lock down vulnerable weapons materials has been strong on rhetoric but weak on action, according to the authors of two extensive new assessments.

"A dangerous gap remains between the urgency of the threat of nuclear terrorism and the scope and pace of the US and world response," according to a report titled "Securing the Bomb," by Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier of Harvard University. "That gap has been narrowed in recent years . . . but much more needs to be done."

A scorecard of the G-8 initiative prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies likewise shows a decidedly mixed record, according to coauthor Robert Einhorn, formerly assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation in the Clinton administration.

The report cites statistics from the G-8 Working Group as showing that only \$3.5 billion has been collected from donor countries. Partly as a result, less than half of the estimated 1,300 tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia has been secured, even though the material is concentrated at a few large sites.

At the same time, there remain 165 nuclear research reactors around the world containing varying quantities of enriched uranium, many of them with few security measures in place, the report said. Key biological weapons sites of the former Soviet Union remain off-limits to international inspectors. Approximately 39,000 tons of Russian chemical weapons -- a grim legacy of the Cold War -- need to be destroyed. No programs exist to inventory or destroy the intact small nuclear devices, known as tactical nukes, left over from the Soviet arsenal.

Many specialists fault the G-8 for dropping the ball.

"The facts are that preventing nuclear terrorism is being treated as an important but not an urgent matter," former US senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, cochairman of the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative in Washington, said in an interview. "On a scale of one to 10 . . . the G-8 should be given a 10 for rhetoric, seven for pledges, and a two for progress on addressing the most urgent issues. Most of the pledges have not turned into programs or actions."

The G-8 members -- Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States -- vowed in 2002 to raise \$20 billion over the next decade to prevent terrorists from developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction or hiring unemployed weapons scientists.

In announcing the new initiative, the G-8 leaders pledged to "work in partnership, bilaterally and multilaterally, to develop, coordinate, implement, and finance, according to their respective means, new or expanded cooperation projects."

As of mid-2005, the initiative had received pledges of \$17.5 billion, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies report, which is based on data compiled by the G-8. The United States has pledged \$10 billion, while other pledges range from as little as \$225,000 from the Czech Republic to as much as \$1.1 billion from Italy. Still, only a small portion of the pledges -- \$3.5 billion -- has actually been given, and half of that was provided by the United States. The donations, specialists said, fall far short of what's needed.

"There needs to be more effort put into this," said Igor A. Khripunov, associate director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia. "It has fallen off the radar."

G-8 officials, in Russia for the summit, did not respond to requests for comment. The United States, for its part, maintains that it is making significant strides of its own, building on the efforts begun after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Despite complaints about its slow pace, the US program has been more successful than the G-8 effort at destroying Cold War-era weapons arsenals, including old nuclear submarines and chemical munitions. The National Nuclear Security Agency, which is part of the Department of Energy, last week completed a two-year program to move highly enriched uranium from the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute in St. Petersburg, Russia, to the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dmitrovgrad, where it will be "downblended" to a less dangerous form and used to fuel Russian nuclear power plants.

Nevertheless, the Russian government has proven increasingly difficult to deal with, according to US government officials and specialists.

"There is a lot of misinformation out there about what is being done and how quickly it is being done," said Julianne Smith, a spokeswoman for the nuclear security agency. "This stuff is very complicated. There is difficulty dealing with the Russians. It is not as easy as saying 'go do this.' They are a sovereign nation."

A major worry is the availability of highly enriched uranium, which most scientists believe could be easily used to design a crude nuclear bomb that could kill hundreds of thousands.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies scorecard, Russia has declared about 500 tons of excess, highly enriched uranium, but only 30 tons per year are being turned into the safer, low-enriched form through the G-8 initiative. At that pace, the materials will not be secured until 2013, the report said.

"Plans are needed to accelerate current blend-down efforts and substantially increase the . . . stockpiles targeted for downblending," the report says.

And the challenge goes far beyond Russia, according to the Harvard report.

"In the rest of the world, there is even less good news," it states. "At many sites around the world, weapons-usable material remains dangerously vulnerable to either outsider or insider theft, even though many countries have strengthened their nuclear security rules since 9/11."

It added: "Civilian facilities such as research reactors often have little more security than a night watchman and a chain-link fence. Pakistan's stockpiles remain an urgent concern; while heavily guarded, they face immense threats, from armed remnants of Al Qaeda to nuclear insiders with a proven willingness to sell nuclear weapons technology."

One of the coauthors of the CSIS report, Michelle A. Flournoy, believes the G-8 effort needs to realign the various ongoing projects with the original rationale of the initiative: reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism.

"We could have gotten much further down this road than we have," she said.

Nunn, whose organization funded the two studies, said he remains puzzled at the apparent low priority in the United States and elsewhere given repeated statements that nuclear terrorism poses the gravest security threat.

Nunn, a Democrat who coauthored the original US program to secure nuclear materials, said one explanation may be that the United States has focused on punishing countries with nuclear programs such as Iran and North Korea -- and not on preventing deadly materials from being sold or purloined.

"All the energy gets put into states and not the bread and butter of securing the actual materials," Nunn said.

"Acquiring weapons and material is the hardest step for terrorists to take but the easiest step for us to stop."

Nunn said in a statement yesterday that Bush and Putin keep saying the right things, but "as we have seen in the past, there can be a big gap between words and deeds, a big gap between pledges and programs, and a big gap between goals and accomplishments."

"Presidents Bush and Putin have charted the course. Now every day, every week, every month for the rest of their terms in office, they must assign clear responsibility and demand accountability from their respective governments."

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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Nuclear Know-How Trail

By F. Michael Maloof

The clandestine nuclear weapons activities of Abdul Qadeer Khan, better known as Dr. A.Q. Khan, have been known for some three decades to U.S. officials. Yet officials want the world to think his activities weren't confirmed until October 2003 when Italian authorities seized a German ship carrying 1,000 centrifuges destined for Libya.

As the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Mr. Khan also assisted North Korea and Iran with their nuclear weapons development programs. Today, these countries are in a position to provide nuclear technology to terrorists that threaten the United States.

In the 1990s, my office at the Defense Department often sought to get the State Department to make diplomatic complaints to Pakistan about Dr. Khan's activities. His activities seriously violated multilateral agreements to which the United States is a signatory and U.S. law against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

My office frequently monitored efforts by Dr. Khan's worldwide network to divert technology to Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program. Our requests repeatedly fell on deaf ears.

We also sought Central Intelligence Agency assistance. The CIA has close ties to Pakistan's Directorate for Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) which helped create Afghanistan's Taliban and still maintains ties to al Qaeda. Indeed, my office often would work with U.S. Customs to track down some of Mr. Khan's U.S. technology acquisitions to halt them before they were exported to Pakistan.

A former high Dutch official recently has contended the CIA knew of Mr. Khan's nuclear acquisition efforts from the early 1970s. Former Dutch Prime Minister Dr. Ruud Lubbers in a recent interview asserted the CIA even intervened to halt any Dutch court action against Mr. Khan. According to Dr. Lubbers, the CIA urged that Mr. Khan be allowed to continue his activities so they could be monitored.

The Dutch sought to convict Mr. Khan after he illegally copied drafts of a URENCO gas centrifuge plant essential for uranium enrichment. URENCO was a joint Dutch, German and British effort in the 1970s. The CIA request to the Dutch strongly suggests it may have known of Mr. Khan's efforts to assist North Korea and Iran in their nuclear development programs. It also suggests the CIA helped facilitate such diversions and may have been aware of Mr. Khan's liaisons with al Qaeda and other terrorist elements.

As it was, the CIA was monitoring the role of the BCCI bank through which Mr. Khan moved money. The CIA also had its own accounts at the BCCI bank. For example, the CIA used BCCI to funnel millions of dollars to the fighters battling the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Bin Laden also had accounts at the bank. BCCI, created by the Pakistanis, also was used by al Qaeda and other terrorist entities in the 1980s to launder money.

In February 2004, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf granted a pardon to Mr. Khan, in effect with U.S. support. Yet, the United States reportedly cannot debrief Mr. Khan to do a threat assessment on the nuclear technologies and capabilities he provided to North Korea and Iran.

By refusing access to Mr. Khan, Mr. Musharraf provides aid and comfort to state sponsors of terrorists targeting the United States. Now North Korea threatens the United States with nuclear war. Mr. Musharraf's shielding of Mr. Khan makes the Pakistani president an accomplice to the very terrorism he professes to oppose.

Why is the United States giving President Musharraf a pass on access to Mr. Khan, despite the apparent damage he has done? Two immediate reasons come to mind.

(1) The Bush administration recently informed Congress it wants to sell 18 new F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan.

(2) During this entire period of trying to halt Mr. Khan's activities, the CIA worked with the Pakistani ISI to recruit the mujahedeen to fight against the Serbs in the Balkans. This was done with the full cooperation of the Pakistani government even before Mr. Musharraf became president.

Recruiting for the Balkans in effect made the United States an ally with Osama bin Laden and Iran in the effort to defeat the Serbs in Bosnia, Kosovo and then Macedonia. That cooperation continued even after bin Laden announced a Jihad, or holy war, against the United States in 1998.

A.Q. Khan has had a lot to do with linking the technical cooperation we see between North Korea and Iran not only in nuclear but also missile development. In fact, this cooperation strongly suggests the two countries may be coordinating their activities in raising any future international hate and discontent.

At a minimum, U.S. authorities need to know more about what capabilities Mr. Khan contributed to both countries. Congress also needs to explore what the CIA knew of Mr. Khan's efforts to provide nuclear know-how to North Korea, Iran and now the terrorists.

F. Michael Maloof is a former senior security policy analyst in the Office of the Defense Secretary.

<http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20060717-084227-2793r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Pyongyang Visit Tied To Nuclear Reactor

By Nicholas Kralev, The Washington Times

The chief U.S. negotiator on North Korea said yesterday that he would visit Pyongyang only after it shuts down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor, although the North's recent missile tests have lessened the chances for a trip in the near future.

Christopher R. Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, also expressed concern that the North Koreans "may not even want a deal" on their nuclear program.

"We would consider a trip if it would serve our interest to do so," Mr. Hill told editors and reporters at a luncheon at The Washington Times.

"But our concern is that North Korea is continuing to run a nuclear reactor whose purpose is to make bombs, and to be talking to them while they are making bombs doesn't appear to be in our interest," he said.

Mr. Hill, who visited China, Japan and South Korea last week to discuss a response to the North's July 4 missile tests, said that the launches "have made the issue of a Pyongyang trip maybe not all that relevant right now."

The North has refused to participate in the six-nation talks, which also include the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, since September, saying that Washington needs to abandon its "hostile policies" first.

The foreign ministers of all six nations are due in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, next week for a regional security forum, and Mr. Hill said he hopes to discuss North Korea.

"There is a good reason to get together at five, if necessary. I prefer six, frankly, but five is better than none," he said, referring to North Korea's boycott of the negotiations.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is scheduled to attend the gathering, he noted, although her planned stops in Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul may have to be canceled if she goes to the Middle East to deal with the crisis in Lebanon.

Mr. Hill rejected accusations that the Bush administration -- whose position is that bilateral meetings can be held only in the context of the six-party talks -- has not had enough direct contacts with North Korea.

"We've met with them in separate rooms, at very big conference tables, in a very dignified setting. We've had plenty of bilateral meetings," he said, adding that he had a private dinner with the North Korean negotiator in Beijing.

"This is about some misplaced concept that somehow we don't give them enough respect. I think they are really trying to gut the process," he said.

Asked whether Pyongyang could be stalling the process hoping for a better deal with the next U.S. administration, Mr. Hill said: "The more fundamental problem is, they are not sure they want a deal, rather than they want a better deal."

He also said that the "defensive measures" in a U.N. Security Council resolution adopted Saturday in response to the missile tests are not sufficient "to address the threat posed by North Korea" and must be backed by a "diplomatic track."

The resolution forbids U.N. members from providing financing or materials to the reclusive state that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Hill pointed out that, even though the long-range Taepodong-2 missile the North tested was unsuccessful, "the Scuds were fired off and everything went pretty well."

North Korea fired seven missiles in all.

"Our best understanding of the Chinese is that they did not know about the missile launch [in advance]," he said, noting that Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader, did not want to meet with a Chinese delegation in Pyongyang last week.

"They take their money," he said in a reference to the substantial aid China gives North Korea, "they just don't take their advice."

The goal of the Bush administration's diplomacy on North Korea is to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, Mr. Hill said. But if that does not work, the six-nation negotiations would have been worthwhile because the other participants will be in a better position to take other measures against the North.

"What we want to see is that the other partners have come to that conclusion with us, because they've had the same negotiating experience we've had," Mr. Hill said.

"Some of those partners, in coming to that conclusion, I think would be in a strong position to take stronger action," he said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20060719-091334-8512r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)